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ABSTRACT: This working-paper deals with the meaning of the subjective theory of value. It is 
argued that in  spite of its wide utilization in economic theory, subjectivism is an equivocal 
concept generating incompatible interpretations. The affluence of various and incompatible 
interpretations is the consequence of a conception that is either too complex or too elastic. This 
is the case since the subjective theory of value cannot accommodate most of the features that are 
traditionally associated with it: utility, marginalism, ordinal evaluation, knowledge, expectations. 
Actually, this working-paper defends a specific view of subjectivism which is much simpler than 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the equivocal character of the subjective theory of value. The 
subjective theory of value has a long and uneasy history (Grice-Hutchinson, 1952. Hutchinson, 
1994). In the course of its wide utilization, subjectivism is often situated at the core of intricate 
debates.  While von Mises  ([1933], 2003, pp. 183-186)  criticizes Menger’s  ([1871], 1994) 
conception of subjectivism, Böhm-Bawerk ([1884-1912], 1959) defends it against Jevons ([1871], 
1888). Lachmann ( 1976, 1978b) looks for an extension of subjectivism beyond the extension 
advocated by Hayek (1952). Rothbard criticizes both propositions for extending subjective theory 
of value (1957, 1973, 1997) and defends Mises’ definition ([1949], 1998). In more recent times, 
this debate has attracted the attention of other scholars. Hoppe (1995, 1998), who reiterates the 
rothbardian arguments, argues against Lavoie (1990, 1994a, 1994b), O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, 
1986), who follow the lachmannian view on subjectivism. Caplan (1999, p. 827) states that the 
difference between the Austrian and the neo-classical subjective theory of value is insignificant. 
Block (1999, pp. 23-25) restates that subjectivism is a specific and exclusive feature of Austrian 
economics. 
Clearly, if we want to reach a further understanding of these debates in economics, we 
first have to assess the concept of subjectivism. This paper will assert that the subjective theory 
of value can be given a very simple formulation. In the light shed by this definition, we claim that 
the affluence of incompatible interpretations is the consequence either of a too complex or too 
elastic concept of the subjective theory of value. Actually, as will be further expounded in this 
paper, the subjective theory of value cannot accommodate most of the features that traditionally 
are associated with it: utility, marginalism, knowledge, expectations. The aim of this paper is to 
assess the subjective theory of value defending a specific view of subjectivism much simpler than 
most of its current interpretations. Bolstered by this argumentation, further research can clarify 
the reasons of these debates on subjectivism.  
Firstly, we are going to provide a clear-cut definition of subjectivism so we can illustrate 
further in our paper why some of the features traditionally associated with subjectivism have to 
be  considered separately.  Secondly,  we  will  emphasize  the heterogeneous character  of 
subjectivism by identifying the variety of concepts usually associated with it: utility, marginalism, 
individualism, knowledge, expectations, and plans. Thirdly, bearing in mind our definition we will 
argue that utility is not a sine qua non ingredient of the subjective theory of value and that 
subjectivism is not another word for marginalism. Fourthly, using the same simple definition of 
subjectivism we will show that the reference to human knowledge and to expectations does not 
suffice to add supplementary degrees to subjectivism. Finally, we will conclude by pinpointing the 
theoretical perspectives opened by this article.   3 
2  SUBJECTIVISM 
At the outset of our analysis, we sustain that “subjectivity” is a property applicable to any 
feature of our world if its existence depends essentially on the acting subject (i.e. it would not 
exist otherwise). For example, the validity of the ideas expressed in this article is subjective if it 
depends on my own opinion. If some readers considered them correct too, then my ideas would 
be inter-subjectively corroborated. Conversely,  the validity of  an idea is objective  if it is 
independent of any acting subject. For example, the validity of the ideas formulated in my article 
is objective if it can be established regardless of any subjective consideration. In that case, these 
ideas would be correct even if everybody considered them false. Actually, the origins of the 
dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism are to be found in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. 
“Just consider this question: – Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it 
holy because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato, Euthyphro, 10a) If piety depends on the subject 
then we have a subjective theory. Otherwise, if piety exists independently of the acting subject we 
may speak of an objective theory. Even though the terms are different, the structure of the 
dichotomy is the same as the dichotomy subjectivism-objectivism. A  “feature-of-our-world” 
exists either as a result or independently of a subject’s action. In the latter case, the “feature-of-
our-world” would be discovered by the acting subject. 
In order to concretely apply this rather general definition of subjectivity we need to spell 
out the meaning of “feature-of-our-world.”  Because in this paper we are concerned with the 
theory of value, we propose to restrict our analysis to the definition of the subjective theory of 
value. To begin with, we notice that value is conditioned by scarcity. An item is scarce if some 
specific means are required to obtain it. For example, a house is scarce since its construction 
needs specific skills and materials, i.e. it cannot be obtained out of nothing. It is precisely for this 
reason that things have value. A choice has to be made regarding the ends to be attained and 
forgone with a given amount of means. The existence of scarcity engenders the necessity to make 
a choice among various ends. Still, this does not tell us if value depends on the acting subject. We 
need a theory of value in order to establish the axiological paradigm to be used for ranging the 
value of various ends. It is only by placing the acting subject in a scarce environment that we can 
formulate such a theory. 
In doing so, Ludwig von Mises pertinently describes the subjective theory of value. “An 
acting man chooses among various opportunities offered for choice. He prefers one alternative to 
others. It is customary to say that an acting man has a scale of wants or values in mind when he 
arranges his actions. On the basis of such a scale he satisfies what is of higher value, i.e., his most 
urgent needs, and leaves unsatisfied what is of lower value,  i.e., what is a less urgent need.” 
(Mises, [1949], 1998, pp. 94-96)  In contrast with Mises’ subjectivism, f rom the objectivist   4 
perspective the value scale resulting from the action of an intentional subject is not necessarily 
the correct one. More precisely, when it is applied to prices, objectivism brings about various 
economic policies hailing for price fixing. (Galbraith, 1952) Actually, every interventionist 
economic policy implicitly supposes that the acting  subject  has  failed in choosing the most 
valuable end. Now we can restate the subjectivist-objectivist dilemma more accurately. Does a 
good have value because an acting subject has chosen it? Does a good have value independently 
of the subject’s choices? In this formulation, it appears obvious that the distinction between 
subjectivism and objectivism of values is exclusive and exhaustive. Subjectivism and objectivism 
do not overlap and they exhaust all possibilities regarding the theory of value. However, the key 
element of this distinction is the real action of an intentional subject. Within the objectivist 
paradigm action, it is possible to establish a value scale independently of the real action of an 
agent. 
Contrary to objectivism, in order to describe a value scale within the subjectivist paradigm 
we must first observe the actual choice of the intentional agent. From the subjectivist perspective, 
there is no value scale in the absence of a completed action. In fact, the advocates of subjectivism 
in the misesian tradition firmly establish this idea. “The concept of demonstrated preference is 
simply this: that actual choice reveals, or demonstrates, a man’s preferences; that is, that his 
preferences are deducible from what he has chosen in action. Thus, if a man chooses to spend an 
hour at a concert rather than a movie, we deduce that the former was preferred, or ranked higher 
on his value scale. Similarly, if a man spends five dollars on a shirt we deduce that he preferred 
purchasing the shirt to any other uses he could have found for the money. This concept of 
preference, rooted in real choices, forms the keystone of the logical structure of economic 
analysis, and particularly of utility and welfare analysis. (…) The clearest and most thorough 
formulation of the concept has been the works of Professor Mises.” (Rothbard, [1956], 1997, p. 
212) 
To sum up, the subjective theory of value consists in saying that value is the outcome of a 
real action purported by an intentional subject. Any other definition of subjectivism is partial or 
overlaps  objectivism.  The absence of a clear-cut  definition of subjectivism  would produce 
misunderstandings. Keeping this definition in mind in the next section, we can better grasp the 
misleading applications of subjectivism in economic theory. In addition, we will then proceed to 
demonstrate that the subjective theory of value is neither broader nor more elastic than the 
definition provided in this section. 
   5 
3  THE FUZZINESS OF SUBJECTIVISM 
 
The main features of subjectivism have been formulated since the Middle Ages (Grice-
Hutchinson, 1952.  De Roover, 1971.  Hutchinson, 1994. Rothbard, 1995.).  “The School of 
Salamanca did make important contributions to economic theory. One of these was their theory 
of value. This theory was based on subjectivism.” (Gallardo, 2002, p. 3) During Modern Times, 
other scholars accurately  defined the subjective theory of value:    “Goods are  more or less 
valuable only because we are judging them more or less  useful and more or less scarce.” 
(Condillac, 1776, p. 17) However, it was at the end of the nineteenth century that the subjective 
theory of value became the source of important disagreements. At that moment, on the account 
of Carl Menger, ([1871], 1994) Léon Walras ([1874], 1952) and William Stanley Jevons ([1871], 
1888), economists formed different economical schools according to the line of argumentation 
they adopted regarding subjectivism. “The subjectivism that developed out of those pioneering 
insights of Carl Menger who founded the Austrian School, has come to mean entirely different 
things to different doctrinal traditions within the modern economics.” (Kirzner, 1995, p. 11). 
Menger’s subjectivism for instance, which later inspired the Austrian School of Economics, is 
usually distinguished from other conceptions because of its emphasis on the ordinal evaluation of 
various commodities. “The value of a particular good or of a given portion of the whole quantity 
of a good at the disposal of an economizing individual is thus for him equal to the importance of 
the least important of the satisfactions assured by the whole available quantity and achieved with 
an equal portion. For it is with  respect to these important satisfactions that the economizing 
individual concerned is dependent on the availability of the particular good, or given quantity of a 
good.” (Menger, [1871], 1994, p. 139) 
Menger derives his conclusion from the idea that the value depends on the importance 
assigned by men to various commodities. 
“Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an 
independent thing existing by itself. It is a judgment economizing men make about the 
importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and well-
being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men. It is therefore, 
also quite erroneous to call a good that has value to economizing individuals a ‘value’, 
or for economists to speak of ‘values’ as of independent real things, and to objectify 
value in this way. For the entities that exist objectively are always only particular things 
or quantities of things, and their value is something fundamentally different from the 
things themselves; it is a  judgment made by economizing individuals about the 
importance their command of the things has for the maintenance  of their lives and 
well-being. Objectification of the value of goods, which is entirely subjective in nature, 
has nevertheless contributed very greatly to confusion about the basic principles of 
our science.” (Menger, [1871], 1994, pp. 120-121) 
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Inspired by the mengerian theory of value, other authors drew attention to some specific 
aspects on topical issues related with subjectivism: utility, imputation, plans. Wieser insisted that 
the insight of evaluating the goods at the margin was made possible by the utility factor. In this 
way, he brought into focus the relation between subjectivism and marginalism. “Any one good, in 
a stock of goods of the same kind, will have in general the value of the final or marginal utility. 
(…) This law of value unites the conceptions of value and of utility in a way that is fully 
confirmed by facts.” (Wieser, [1889], Natural Value Bk. I Ch. 9, NV-I-9.2) On the same line of 
thought, Böhm-Bawerk hails for an incorporation of the law of costs into the marginal utility 
theory. “We, marginal-value theorists (…) instead of placing the law of costs outside or against 
the law of marginal utility, with which, indeed, we cannot do without in our own explanation of 
the height of costs, we systematically incorporate it into the universal law of marginal utility.” 
(Böhm-Bawerk [1892], (2002) p. 49) Kaufmann insists on the importance of economic plans for 
subjectivism. “According to the subjective theory of value the central economic problems, i.e. 
those of price determination, can only be tackled with the prospect of achieving useful results if 
the economic activity to which they refer is traced back to an economic plan.” (Kaufmann, 1933, 
p. 395) 
However, other contemporary authors dissociate the subjective theory of value from the 
theory of marginal utility. “Subjectivism is more than the recognition that value is determined by 
subjective preferences at the margin.” ( Peter Lewin, p. 235) Often, this difference between 
marginalism and subjectivism is assigned to knowledge or expectations. Within this theoretical 
perspective, subjectivism is considered as being much broader than marginalism. Various scholars 
propose to apply subjectivism not only to tastes but also to knowledge. “The next step forward in 
the subjectivist paradigm was to recognize that the subjectivity of value depended on a further 
subjectivity, namely knowledge.”  (Horwitz, 1994, p. 18)  This  application o f subjectivism to 
knowledge stimulates  alternative ways  of defining  subjectivism:  radical,  dynamic or  ultra 
subjectivism. 
In the eyes of Shackle, “the essence of the radical subjectivist position is that the future is 
not simply unknown but nonexistent, and the notion of foreknowledge of human affairs is 
vacuous.” (Shackle, 1983, p. 33) Associating subjectivism with the concept of “active mind”,  
O’Driscoll and Rizzo adhere to what they call dynamic subjectivism. “[Dynamic subjectivism] views 
the mind as an active, creative entity in which decision-making bears no determinate relationship 
to what went before” (O’Driscoll & Rizzo, 1985, p. 22) However, the distinction between radical 
and dynamic subjectivism is not always clear. “According to O’Driscoll and R izzo dynamic 
subjectivism is the essence of the Austrian tradition. Although the authors do not use the term   7 
‘radical subjectivism’, they nevertheless adhere to a similar idea: the fact that human action takes 
place within time and that individuals act in a world of ignorance (in the sense of Shackle, not in 
that of Kirzner).” (Gloria-Palermo, 1999, p. 138)  
Moreover, according to Kirzner there is a conception of  subjectivism  originated in 
mainstream economics that he defines as ultra-subjectivism. “There is a line of criticism of the 
subjectivist economics which we have outlined in this paper which proceeds from the 
diametrically opposite methodological direction (from that of mainstream economics). Such 
ultra-subjectivist criticism objects, not to our emphasis upon the subjectivist freedom of 
individual decision-making, but to our insistence that such freedom is entirely consistent with (in 
fact necessary for) the emergence of systematic microeconomic forces. The position taken by 
these critics is likely to emphasize the possibilities for entrepreneurial error and, in particular, the 
possibility that interacting entrepreneurial errors may magnify the scope for and likelihood of 
entrepreneurial errors. (This, for example, is what Keynes was referring to in comparing the stock 
market to a casino.)” (Kirzner, 2000, p. 71) 
In addition to these very divergent versions of subjectivism, Buchanan proposes another 
one. “There are other versions of ‘economic subjectivism’ that can be distinguished from both its 
radical and Austrian variety, in particular the ‘opportunity cost approach’ that was systematically 
stated by one of the present authors (Buchanan).” (Buchannan & Vanberg, 1994, p. 330, n. 8) . 
Besides the variety of subjectivism names, the relation between subjectivism and methodological 
individualism  is also  contested.  “Methodological individualism is a healthy, but perhaps 
redundant, principle to the extent that it makes the claim that explanations of action should refer 
to the subjectively perceived constraints and incentives faced by individual actors. (Don Lavoie, 
1994a, p. 58) 
Menger’s reference to utility in its relation to value is very different from Warlas. Actually 
contrary to Menger, Walras  states that utility can be weighted. “ The circumstance which 
obviously precludes numerical measurement does not by any means rule out pure and simple 
mathematical expressions. In physics as in mechanics, one operates mathematically with entities, 
such as mass, which are not directly measurable either. Let us follow the same procedure. We 
need only suppose that utility is measurable and we are at once able to give an exact, 
mathematical account of the influence utility exerts, along with the quantity initially owned, on 
demand curves and hence on prices?” (Walras, [1874], translated from French in Jaffé, 1977, p. 
300)   8 
The way that Menger  associates value and utility also sharply  contrasts  with  Jevons’ 
statement that values of different commodities can be measured through the consumers’ degree 
of utility. 
“One of the first and most difficult steps in a science is to conceive clearly the 
nature of the magnitudes about which we are arguing (….) As was fully explained in 
chapter II, the ultimate quantities which we treat in Economics are Pleasure and Pains, 
and our most difficult task will be to express their dimensions correctly. In the first 
place, pleasure and pain must be regarded as measured upon the same scale, and as 
having, therefore, the same dimensions, being quantities of the same kind, which can 
be added and subtracted; they differ only in sign or direction. Now the only dimension 
belonging properly to feeling seems to be intensity, and this intensity must be 
independent both of time and of the quantity of the commodity enjoyed. The intensity 
of feeling must mean, then, the instantaneous state produced by an elementary or 
infinesimal quantity of commodity consumed. Intensity of feeling, however, is only 
another name for degree of utility, which represents the favourable effect produced 
upon the human frame by the consumption of commodity, that is by an elementary or 
infinesimal quantity of commodity. Putting U to indicate this dimension, we must 
remember that U will not represent even the full dimensions of the instantaneous state 
of pleasure and pain, much less the  continued state which extends over a certain 
duration of time.”  (Jevons, [1871], 1888, pp. 53-54) 
 
Following Jevons, many authors stated that utility has to be cardinal so we can measure it. 
In this way, utility can find applications in various fields of economical theory.  For example, 
Harsanyi also applies cardinal utility to welfare economics.  
“This implies, however, (…) that an individual's impersonal preferences, if 
they are rational, must satisfy Marschak's axioms and consequently must define a 
cardinal social welfare function equal to the arithmetical mean of the utilities of all 
individuals in the society (since the arithmetical mean of all individual utilities gives the 
actuarial value of his uncertain prospect, defined by an equal probability of being put 
in the place of any individual in the situation chosen). More exactly, if the former 
individual has any objective criterion for comparing his fellows' utilities with one 
another and with his own his social welfare function will represent the unweighted 
mean of these utilities, while in the absence of such an objective criterion it will, in 
general, represent their weighted mean, with arbitrary weights depending only on his 
personal value judgments. In the former case social welfare will in a sense  be an 
objective quantity, whereas in the latter case it will contain an important subjective 
element; but even in this latter case it will be something very different from the utility 
function of the individual concerned.” (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 316) 
 
Cardinal utility applications also concern risk taking actions. “Recently, however, [J. von 
Neumann, O. Morgenstern, M. Friedman and L. J. Savage] introduced the concept of cardinal 
utility also in the theory of choices involving risk”. (Harsanyi, 1953, p. 434)  Actually, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern consider that risk and uncertainty cannot be properly studied in the 
absence of cardinal utility. “The concept of cardinal utility theory was revived by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern in their analysis of behavior under uncertainty, and its application to game 
theory, based on the idea of expected utility maximization. When faced with an uncertain 
prospect, under which any of a set of outcomes could occur with known probability, von   9 
Neumann and Morgenstern suggested attaching a numerical utility to each outcome and 
evaluating the prospect by calculating the mean value of the utilities. This procedure is feasible 
only for cardinal measures of utility.” (Quiggin, 1999, p. 592) This proposition criticizes the New 
Welfare Economics which dismisses cardinal utility. “The quantitative concept of utility is not 
necessary in order to explain market phenomena. Therefore, on the principle of Occam’s razor, it 
is better to do without it.” (Hicks, 1939 p. 18) 
Despite  its conciseness,  this presentation  suffices to  show that  the  applications of 
subjectivism are extremely heterogeneous. Actually, the incompatibility between various 
interpretations of subjectivism leaves some  questions  concerning the very meaning  of 
subjectivism  unanswered.  What is the relation between subjectivism,  marginalism,  utility, 
knowledge or expectations? Is the subjective theory of value identical with the marginal theory of 
value or with the methodological individualism? Is it possible to accommodate incompatible 
conceptions of subjectivism? What factors distinguish the advocates of subjectivism from their 
alleged  rivals, the objectivists?  Although the aim of this paper is not to provide systematic 
answers for each of these questions, we think that by explaining the meaning of subjectivism we 
can make such an endeavor possible for further research. 
However, the absence of clear-cut answers to these questions suggests that the very 
signification of subjectivism is fuzzy. We can get a better picture of this fuzziness if we isolate the 
various elements usually mentioned as determinants of the subjective theory of value: utility, 
marginalism, knowledge, expectations. We now have to distinguish between the debates on the 
meaning of subjectivism and the propositions to extend subjectivism. On one hand, utility and 
marginalism are considered as essential components of subjectivism. There is a common idea that 
evaluating the goods at the margin and/or grounding this evaluation on individuals’ utility is 
enough to claim a subjective theory of value. On the other hand, knowledge and expectations are 
considered suitable for extending subjectivism.  In the remaining part of this paper we will 
criticize both ideas. In the next section we will show why neither utility nor marginalism can 
account for the subjective theory of value. Further on we will also show that the reference to 
knowledge and to expectations cannot enlarge subjectivism. 
 
4  THE MEANING OF SUBJECTIVISM 
    We previously outlined two different types of utility: ordinal and cardinal. The former was 
developed within the  Austrian tradition initiated by Menger. The latter was built in the neo-
classical tradition initiated by Jevons. Despite this difference we can observe that both authors 
think that utility is an extrinsic property of goods. Ordinal and cardinal utility are an intrinsic   10 
property of human beings. For both authors and traditions, a commodity is not useful per se but 
only in relation with acting persons. This means that a commodity cannot be useful in the 
absence of intentional agents. As Jevons declares, “in the first place, utility, though a quality of 
things, is no inherent quality. It is better described as a circumstance of things arising out of their 
relation to man's requirements.” (Jevons, [1871], 1888, p. 44) Menger also states that value is 
“nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, but merely the importance that we first 
attribute to the satisfaction of our needs, that is, to our lives and well-being, and in consequence 
carry over to economic goods as the exclusive causes of the satisfaction of our needs.” (Carl 
Menger, [1871], 1994, p. 116)  
This idea encourages the authors of economy textbooks to assert that notwithstanding 
their differences both authors have a similar conception of utility. “Carl Menger’s description of 
total utility and marginal utility was similar to that of Jevons.” (Hunt, 2002, p. 257) This remains 
true in spite of various endeavours to dehomogenize the “fathers of marginalism” (Jaffé’s [1971], 
1983. Streissler, 1988). Actually, none of these endeavours does target the fact that, from the 
point of view of the “marginalist fathers”, utility is an extrinsic property of goods. “The question 
I propose to raise here is (…) whether the use of any single appellation to designate the three 
‘revolutionary’ innovations of the 1870s obscures precisely those differences which the passage of 
time has revealed more important than anything they may have had in common.” (Jaffé, [1971], 
1983, p. 311) Hence, economists maintain the fact that Jevons, Menger and Walras altogether 
emphasize the concept of utility thus producing what we usually call the marginalist or neo-
classical revolution. “In the last quarter of the nineteen century, the main interest in economics 
shifted totally: the so called marginalist or neo-classical revolution focused mainly on price 
determination; and prices were no longer thought to be determined chiefly by production or the 
supply of commodities, but above all by individual demand. (…) The neo-classical revolution was 
brought about by three distinct authors in three different places: Jevons, Walras and Menger.” 
(Streissler, 1988, p. 192) 
Furthermore, this shift from labour to utility (as the authors of marginal revolution 
advocate it) is also seen as the angular stone of subjectivism.  “The ‘marginalist’ revolution is 
often given the title of a ‘subjectivist’ revolution. Marginalists have set a theory based on the 
relationship of men and needs in relation to objects and their ability to satisfy such needs against 
the objective theory of value in terms of production costs construed by the classical authors.” 
(Gloria-Palermo, 1999, p. 33). The idea that utility is an essential component of subjectivism has 
become  fashionable among economists  especially  since Hayek ( 1952, p. 38)  evocated the 
advances in economic theory due to subjectivism. “The main component of the advances he had   11 
in mind was presumably the replacement, after 1870, of the English classical value-theory, as a 
result of the ‘marginal’ or, in England, the ‘Jevonian’ revolution. A ‘cost-of-production’ theory of 
value was replaced by a theory based on utility or preference.” (Hutchinson, 1994, p. 197) Since 
Hayek’s statement, for many economists subjectivism has become recognisable by the reference 
made to utility. “Subjectivism often refers to one of a number of substantive explanatory claims 
in economics. (…) Subjectivism in explanatory sense is associated with the marginal utility theory 
of Menger, Jevons and Walras.” (O’Neil, 1998, p. 41) 
It is precisely this we want to criticize first of all. In the light shed by the definition of 
subjectivism  provided previously, w e sustain that utility does not account for subjectivism. 
Furthermore, the evaluation (being ordinal or cardinal) of a good at the margin does not coincide 
with the subjective theory of value. The nineteenth century revolution(s) (marginalist and/or neo-
classical) should be clearly distinguished  from the  subjective revolution.  The nub of this 
superficial assimilation of subjectivism in marginalism is the concept of utility. The incontestable 
fact that marginalist authors switched Adam Smith’s economic discourse about value from labour 
to utility  does not suffice to credit them as subjectivists. “It must, however, be insisted that 
though such a fundamental  shift might be regarded as a potential advance in a ‘subjective’ 
direction, it remains highly questionable whether, or how far, any ‘consistent application of 
subjectivism’ can be said to have taken place, either in Britain, Austria or Lausanne. (…) To 
accept that the tastes of individuals differ is not necessarily to treat them as ‘subjective’.” 
(Hutchinson, 1994, p. 197) Let us now explain further why it is erroneous to assume that utility is 
a sine qua non condition of subjectivism. 
To begin with, we should observe that Jevons’ assertion “that value depends entirely 
upon utility” (Jevons, [1871], 1888, p. 25) does not actually explain value. One must first define 
utility in order to build up a theory of value. When does a thing become useful? A good can be 
considered useful either because or in spite of the acting subject’s choice. Saying that value 
depends on utility does not clarify this dilemma. In order to solve it, we need a criterion for 
establishing when a good becomes useful. For example, a house is useful because an intentional 
subject chooses to construct it. But we can say also that the house would be useful even if the 
same subject decided to do something else with the same amount of means. These two ideas 
underline two opposed views on utility: subjective and objective. If a good becomes useful 
because it is chosen in the course of a real action, then we formulate a subjective theory of utility. 
Otherwise, if it is said that a good is useful independently of the acting subject, we establish ipso 
facto an objective theory of utility. This is the main reason why value can not be explained in the 
merit of utility. Now it is clearer to see that the concept of “utility,” in addition to the subjective   12 
theory of value, can also support the objective theory of value. It suffices to say that a commodity 
is useful independently of the fact that it is chosen by the acting subject. If we establish a “map of 
tastes” (Pareto, [1909], 1972, p. 120) independently of the real actions of intentional subjects we 
formulate ipso facto an objective theory of value based on the concept of utility. There is no 
logical contradiction in saying that the utility of the intentional subjects exists independently of 
them. 
The same thing can be said about marginalism. There is no contradiction in embracing 
both marginalism and objectivism. The evaluation of a commodity at the margin is not equivalent 
to the subjective theory of value. Actually, the idea of evaluating a commodity at the margin can 
be obtained without any reference to the subject’s choice. The “marginalist revolution” only 
introduced  the idea that there is a scale of different units of the same good.  Marginalism 
destructured goods by showing that the acting subjects do not consume “water” or “diamonds” 
but precise units of these commodities. Consequently, we have to take into account a scale of 
values. But marginalism does not say which criterion should be used in order to sort the value of 
the various units of a specific commodity. We may sustain that any subject sorts it in the course 
of his action (subjectivism), but we could also state that this scale is given for the acting subject 
(objectivism). 
Furthermore, not only the simple evaluation at  the  margin is not equivalent  to 
subjectivism, but neither is the ordinal evaluation. With the help of the definition of subjectivism 
previously  exposed, we may now observe that not even the distinction between cardinal and 
ordinal utility has an impact whatsoever on subjectivism. While the champions of cardinal utility 
are not unanimously considered as subjectivists, things are different when it comes to the 
advocates of ordinal utility.  “As Streissler and Jaffé have argued, not all versions of the 
marginalist revolution were the same, and the distinct contribution of Menger’s marginalism was 
its subjectivism.” (Horwitz, 2003, p. 266). According to some scholars, even if we may question 
the fact that Jevons and Walras formulated a subjective theory of value, we should accept without 
further discussion the fact that Menger’s version of marginalism is synonymous of subjectivism. 
“Of the three fundamental features of marginalism (…) it is subjectivism which appears, a priori, 
to present  the  fewest problems. We can certainly not deny the subjectivist foundation of 
Menger’s approach.” (Gloria-Palermo, 1999, p. 33)  
Historians of economics derive the specificity of the Austrian school of economics from 
this idea.  “In many ways it is only natural that Austrians adopt a full-blown subjectivist 
perspective, in that it was Carl Menger who founded the Austrian school on the basis of the 
subjective theory of economic value. Rather than adopt his predecessors’ labour theory of value ,   13 
Menger argued that value is entirely subjective in nature.” (Horwitz, 1994, p. 18). In the merit of 
our previous argumentation, we will now argue against this idea. To be sure, our argumentation 
disputes the fact that “Menger was in many ways a subjectivist” (Jeremy Shearmur, 1990, p. 190) 
and the existence of a “dynamic subjectivism in Menger’s approach.” (Gloria-Palermo, 1999, p. 
33, original emphasis). We sustain that ordinal evaluation of commodities is not equivalent to 
subjectivism. Obviously, we can have an ordinal evaluation of goods which is objective, i.e. given 
for the acting subject. 
Menger distinguishes himself from other marginalists by his emphasis on the ordinal 
ranking of goods. “ In order to restate the preceding argument numerically, to facilitate 
comprehension of the subsequent difficult investigation, I shall designate the importance of 
satisfactions on which life depends with 10, and the lesser importance of other satisfactions 
successively with 9, 8, 7, 6 etc. I n this way we obtain a scale of the importance of different 
satisfactions that begins with 10 and ends with 1.” (Menger, [1871], 1994, p. 125) Indeed, the 
choice  of  an ordinal  evaluation of commodities  (which excludes the attribution of cardinal 
magnitudes) does not allow further mathematical calculus. Nevertheless, the ordinal evaluation of 
goods does not completely match with subjectivism. There is no logical contradiction between 
adopting an ordinal scale of values and sustaining that it is objective, i.e. independent of the 
acting subject. In fact, in Menger’s work we can observe the predisposition to an objective scale 
of values. 
Menger discerns real from imaginary value. “Regarding this knowledge, however, men 
can be in error about the value of goods just as they can be in error with respect to all other 
objects of human knowledge. Hence, they may attribute value to things that do not, according to 
economic considerations, possess it in reality, if they mistakenly assume that the more or less 
complete satisfaction of their needs depends on a good, or quantity of goods, when this 
relationship is really non-existent. In cases of this sort we observe the phenomenon of imaginary 
value.” (Menger, [1871], 1994, p. 120) At the same time, Menger tends to objectively attribute a 
superior value to some goods to the detriment of other goods. “As concerns the difference in 
importance that different satisfactions have for us, it is above all a fact of the most common 
experience that the satisfactions of greatest importance to men are usually those on which the 
maintenance of life depends, and that other satisfactions are graduated in magnitude of 
importance according to the degree (duration and intensity) of pleasure dependent upon them. 
(…) With the same intensity, they will prefer pleasures of longer duration to pleasures of shorter 
duration, and with the same duration, pleasure of greater intensity to pleasure of less intensity.” 
(Menger, [1871], 1994, pp. 122-123).   14 
It is symptomatic that Mises, although recognizing Menger’s merits in formulating the law 
of marginal utility, criticizes him for approving the existence of an intrinsic value of goods. 
“Unfortunately, Menger did not adhere to this principle of subjectivity in his description of the 
qualities that make things good in the economic sense. (…) Menger distinguishes between real 
and imaginary wants. To realize how pointless this dichotomy between real and imaginary goods 
is, one need only consider the examples cited by Menger. Among others, he designates as 
imaginary goods utensils used in idolatry, most cosmetics, etc. Yet prices are demanded and 
offered for these things too, and we have to explain these prices.” (Mises, [1933], 2003, pp.183-
186). 
In fact, Menger’s hierarchy of values can be considered akin to the classical utilitarian one. 
Actually, Bentham, John Stuart Mill and other authors writing within the utilitarian tradition had 
already formulated and discussed the taxonomy of pleasures or utilities. “To a person considered 
by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to 
the four following circumstances: its intensity, its duration,  its certainty or uncertainty, its 
propinquity or remoteness.” (Bentham, 1823, pp. 49-50). However, raking values or utilities on 
an ordinal scale still does not say anything about the acting subject. This ordinal scale can be 
subjective (i.e.  revealed in  the  course of action of an intentional subject) or objective (i.e. 
discovered by and/or imposed on the acting subject).  
Until now, we  have demonstrated that utility and marginal evaluation of commodities 
(also in its ordinal variant) do not match with subjectivism. We argued that it is not sufficient to 
declare that value depends on utility or that value is ordinal in order to formulate a subjective 
theory of value. As previously stated, subjectivism is related (essentially and inseparably) to the 
acting subject. To put it shortly, the core of subjectivism is the fact that the acting subject reveals 
the value scale in the course of his own action. In the last part of this paper, we will apply the 
definition of subjectivism formulated at the beginning  still f urther, in order to show that 
subjectivism has no degrees. We will show that neither “knowledge” nor “expectations” are able 
to change the proper meaning of subjectivism. 
 
5    THE LIMITS OF SUBJECTIVISM  
Numerous contemporary scholars, who claim their affiliation to the Austrian school of 
economics, assert  that subjectivism is constructed  in  several  steps. They also state that the 
elasticity of subjectivism depends on its various applications (knowledge and expectations). 
“Austrians call this either ‘thorough-going’ or ‘radical’ subjectivism, to differentiate it from the 
more limited subjectivism of neo-classical economics that is  content to posit subjective   15 
preferences with little attention to other manifestations of human subjectivism in its theories. 
Such other manifestations include the subjectivism of expectations and of knowledge itself.” 
(Vaughn, 1994, p. 4) It is precisely this point that we want to criticize in the present section. We 
sustain that the meaning of subjectivism does not allow us to extend it beyond the definition 
provided at the beginning of our paper. 
In considering subjectivism  as being the main feature  which brings about advances in 
economic analysis, F.A. Hayek suggests that the subjectivist revolution has not been completed. 
“Every important advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in 
the consistent application of subjectivism.” (Hayek, 1952, p. 38) Since there is room left for new 
applications of subjectivism, Hayek indicates the concept of knowledge as the new “last frontier” 
in the extension of subjectivism. “What is more important is that the term subjective stresses 
another important fact to which we shall yet have to refer: that the knowledge and beliefs of 
different people, while possessing that common structure which makes communication possible, 
will yet be different and often conflicting in many respects. If we could assume that all the 
knowledge and beliefs of different people were identical, or if we were concerned with a single 
mind, it would not matter whether we described it as an ‘objective’ fact or as a subjective 
phenomenon.” (Hayek, 1952, p. 57, original emphasis) 
When Hayek emphasizes knowledge as an additional application of subjectivism, he takes 
into account the subject’s knowledge of the circumstances of his action. He argues that no single 
individual could possibly have a complete knowledge of all the circumstances of his action. In 
addition, knowledge is dispersed within society. “The concrete knowledge which guides the 
action of any group of people never exists as a consistent and coherent body. It only exists in the 
dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it appears in many individual minds, and 
the dispersion and imperfection of knowledge are two basic facts from which the social sciences 
have to start.” (Hayek, 1952, pp. 57-58). From the theoretical standpoint that knowledge is 
diffused, Hayek concludes that the correct use of knowledge within society has become the main 
economic problem. “The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is 
determined precisely by the fact that knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use 
never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. (…) The economic 
problem of society (…) is rather the problem of how to secure the best use of resources known 
to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals 
know. Or to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to 
anyone in its totality.” (Hayek, 1945, pp. 259-260).   16 
Stimulated by Hayek, Lachmann hails for another advance in economic theory by 
applying subjectivism to expectations, i.e. to knowledge  of the future.  “The first and most 
prominent feature of Austrian economics is a radical subjectivism, today no longer confined to 
human preferences but extended to expectations. It found its perfect expression many years ago 
in Hayek’s statement, ‘it is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in 
economic theory d uring the last hundred years  has been a further step in the consistent 
application of subjectivism’.” (Lachmann, 1978a, p. 1)  Don Lavoie  sees in the lachmannian 
proposition the clear influence of Shackle and Keynes. “In macroeconomics, subjectivism was 
advanced by Keynes’s introduction of expectations into economics. (…) One of the Keynesians 
who did not abandon Keynes’s move into subjectivism, but instead radicalized it, was 
Lachmann’s close friend George Shackle.” (Don Lavoie, 1994b, p . 17) Thanks to Lachmann, 
radical subjectivism became the label of the extension of subjectivism to expectations. “I will call 
the problem of building a radically subjectivist theory of expectations the ‘Lachmann problem’.” 
(Koppl, 1998, p. 61). 
In Lachmann’s opinion, to understand human action correctly we should consider not 
only the knowledge of the circumstances of action, but also the knowledge of future actions or 
events. By applying subjectivism to expectations, Lachmann concludes that we are completely 
ignorant with regard to the future. “The future is to all of us unknowable.” (Lachmann, 1976, pp. 
55-59) Not only the acting subject has a partial knowledge and that knowledge cannot possibly be 
embodied in one single individual, but  moreover, according  to Lachmann,  he is completely 
ignorant of the future. This means that there is nothing which the acting subject can possibly 
know. In addition, Lachmann asserts that by considering the divergence between expectations, 
the last frontier of subjectivism can be pushed even further. “It is quite possible that a bastion of 
extended subjectivism, enhanced by the inclusion of divergent expectations, will offer us an 
excellent vantage point from which to watch the happening of such a society in a dispassionate 
perspective, a perspective superior to what we have had before.”  (Lachmann, 1976,  p. 61). 
Furthermore, the potentialities of subjectivism which can be extended are not exhausted with 
“knowledge”, “expectations” or “divergent expectations.” According to Lachmann, there is still 
room for other extensions of subjectivism. “In this century subjectivism has been extended from 
human preferences to expectations. In years to come it may be extended to the interpretation of 
so-called information.” (Lachmann, 1978b, p. 57) 
Another label associated with the extension of subjectivism  is dynamic subjectivism.  
“Explorations of subjectivism in recent years have drawn our attention to 
several quite different levels at which individual choice may be discussed. In particular 
two levels have been identified; one terminology identifies them as (a) ‘static 
subjectivism’ and (b) ‘dynamic subjectivism’ respectively. (…) From this Shacklean   17 
perspective, a ‘dynamically’ subjectivist view of social history sees it as being governed 
by forces that must be traced back to choices being made, at each and every moment, 
by individual market participants whose decisions can in no manner or form be 
treated as flowing inexorably out of the objective circumstances prevailing at the 
instant prior to these respective decisions. (…) The ‘statically subjectivist’ view 
portrays the decision as indeed expressing the subjective preferences of the decision 
maker, but makes it appear as if these preferences are somehow separate from (and in 
some versions, chronologically prior to) the decision itself, and as if these preferences 
then ‘determine’ the specific decision taken.”(Kirzner, 1986, pp. 138-139)  
 
Although this claim overlaps radical subjectivism, the concept of dynamic subjectivism 
gives preeminence to changes and to the individuals’ reactions to these changes. Under the name 
of dynamic subjectivism, Gerarld P. O’Driscoll Jr. and Mario J. Rizzo summarize the “four major 
features of subjectivist analysis.” 
“First, the analyst employs the method of mind constructs by modeling 
fictitious consciousness endowed with goals, knowledge, expectations and constraints. 
(…) Second, the mind construct is portrayed as existing in real time. Real time, or 
more precisely, the subjective perception of the passage of time, is inextricably linked 
to ineradicable uncertainty, irreversibility of processes and continuous flow of 
information. (…) Third, agents are seen to be capable of creative and not just passive 
decision-making. (…) Fourth, there is a recognition that different individuals have 
different knowledge. Just as there is a division of labor in society, so too there is a 
division of knowledge.” (O’Driscoll, & Rizzo 1986, pp. 253-254)  
 
At the core of all propositions to extend subjectivism is the idea that it is an elastic 
concept with several degrees. “I have to confess that I know of no criterion that would permit us 
to decide whether a movement of thought has reached its ‘end’ and is thus ‘complete’.” 
(Lachmann, 1978b, p. 57) In addition to its elasticity, there is a claim that a higher degree of 
subjectivism would be preferable to a lesser degree. “Throughout, the emphasis is upon a high 
degree of subjectivism.” (D. P. O’Brien, 1990, p. 158) These are precisely the ideas that we are 
going to criticize. We will argue that subjectivism is not an elastic concept. We previously stated 
that value (subjective or objective) implies the existence of degrees. By no means can it be 
inferred from this that subjectivism has degrees. To be sure, the existence of value degrees does 
not entail subjectivism degrees. The very existence of scarcity implies that not all ends can be 
accomplished with the same amount of means. Hence, we should at least distinguish between 
more and less urgent ends to be satisfied with the same amount of means. This does not imply 
that value is more and less subjective. 
Let us now explain what the existence of value degrees presupposes. The conception of 
subjectivism previously provided clearly states that a value is subjective if, and only if, it is 
revealed in the course of an action. What would it mean then to have degrees of subjectivism? 
There are only two ways to define subjectivism degrees. Either value is more or less revealed in 
the course of the subject’s action, or the subject is more or less a subject. If we follow the latter   18 
alternative, the degrees of subjectivism would be varying alongside the degrees of determination 
of the subject. If we consider the former alternative, the degrees of subjectivism would be varying 
alongside the subject’s aptitude to reveal value through his action. In both cases, subjectivism 
degrees depend on the subject’s autonomy. If we suppose that the acting subject is not a fully 
autonomous person (i.e. his actions are caused by society, nature or moon cycles), then the 
subjective value will be varying alongside the degree of causation. The more the acting subject is 
determined by  society (let  us  say 10%), the less the subjective theory  of value applies (90%). 
Now, it becomes obvious that a maximum extent of subjectivism will be possible when the acting 
subject is fully autonomous. Once we admit the acting subject’s full autonomy, subjectivism 
cannot be enlarged anymore. We can now understand why neither knowledge nor expectations 
can allow extensions of the subjective theory of value. 
A full autonomous subject  being ignorant and having personal  expectations cannot 
become ipso facto more or less autonomous. To put it differently, the type of knowledge or 
expectations does not influence  the  subject’s autonomy. Different subjects have different 
knowledge and different expectations as Hayek, Shackle, Lachmann and other advocates of an 
enlarged  subjectivism state.  “Living within a universe where information is imperfect, every 
individual, because of his action, benefits from additional knowledge which should necessarily 
alter his perception of the environment and of the opportunities for satisfaction open to him. 
The consumer’s subjective judgment is thus modified by the choice made. As at the outset 
players have different knowledge processes at their disposal concerning their nature, quantity and 
also their structure, this further information brought by time is unlikely to be interpreted in the 
same way by each individual.” (Aimar, 2004, p. 309) 
Indeed the type of knowledge and expectations is able to modify the subject’s value scale. 
However, from this fact we cannot infer that the acting subject becomes more or less an acting 
subject. It is not because  a  “consumer’s subjective judgment” changes in function of his 
knowledge, expectations etc. that the subjective theory of value changes accordingly.  The 
acquisition of new information may lead the consumer to regret his past actions. But this does 
not change the fact that, within the subjectivist paradigm, the consumer made the best choice. 
Even if ex post the acting subject judges his previous preference scale to be unsatisfying, we 
cannot infer that ex ante he would prefer less. Regrets about past evaluations do not influence the 
subjective features of the  respective scale  of value.  Considering that neither knowledge nor 
expectations can have an influence whatsoever on the agent’s autonomy, we can conclude that 
subjectivism cannot be extended in this direction.   19 
However, there is no possible direction in which subjectivism can be extended. Actually, 
it would be absurd to acknowledge degrees within the subjective theory of value. Even admitting 
a subject less-than-fully autonomous, he would still make choices according to his remaining free 
will. Given the scarcity of our world, we still need to consider a theory of value (subjective or 
objective) in relation to the choices of a less-than-fully autonomous subject. For this remaining 
slice of autonomy, we will apply a theory of value (subjective or objective). When considering the 
slice of external determination, the theory of value simply does not apply. A less-than-fully 
autonomous agent can be less responsible of his own actions but he cannot reveal the value less. 
This is precisely why the theory of value (subjective or objective) applies only to an intentional 
agent in a scarce world. To sum up, in this section we have argued that subjectivism has no 
degrees. The limit of subjectivism is given by its own definition. 
 
6  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we  have  concentrated our argumentation on the  proper  meaning of 
subjectivism. We provided a clear-cut distinction from objectivism and we explored the fuzziness 
of traditional conceptions of subjectivism. In the light shed by the initial definition, we argued 
that neither utility nor marginalism imply subjectivism. In addition, we showed that subjectivism 
is neither extensible to knowledge nor to expectations. Let us now conclude our paper by making 
explicit the theoretical consequences and the perspectives opened by this work. 
The most significant consequence on the history of economic thought is that the debate 
on the concept of utility has to be distinguished from the debate on subjectivism. Textbooks on 
economic history (Hunt, 2002, p. 126. Hutchinson, 1994. Schumpeter, 1954) identify labor as 
being determinant for the objective theory of value, and utility as being determinant for the 
subjective theory of value. Our argumentation pinpoints  precisely the inadequacy of this 
assimilation. We argued that the mention of utility and the proposition of an ordinal hierarchy of 
value do not provide a subjective theory of value. This is why neither utility nor the ordinal scale 
of values are necessarily revealed in the course of the action of an intentional agent. 
It is precisely  for this reason that historians of economic  thought  should  operate a 
distinction  in  the  analysis of  the modern debate on imputation. T he debate on the value 
ingredients (labor versus utility) should be distinguished from the debate on the theory of value 
(subjective or objective). Furthermore, the endeavors to revisit the groundbreaking character of 
marginal revolution (De Roover, 1971, Rothbard, 1995) may find a support in the main idea 
exposed in this paper. T he  acting  subject is the proper criterion to distinguish between 
subjectivism and objectivism. With this criterion at hand, we should find a greater support for the   20 
idea that medieval scholars and pre-classical economists have formulated the subjective theory of 
value more accurately  than the celebrated marginalist authors. For instance, the definition of 
subjectivism provided in the first section ( value is revealed in the course of action of an 
intentional subject) matches better with the definitions formulated by Condillac and the scholars 
of the Salamanca School than with the definitions by Jevons, Menger and Walras.   
In addition to the effects of our argumentation on the history of economic thought, it is 
also important to stress its theoretical consequences. Hence, we have to observe that advocating 
subjectivism is an essentially different matter than advocating utilitarianism. Since utility is not an 
essential ingredient of subjectivism, the results of the debates on value measurability and/or 
cardinality have no influence whatsoever on the subjective theory of value. Whether value is 
ordinal or cardinal,  it  makes no difference  in the opposition between subjectivists and 
objectivists. The issue of value measurability does not influence the subjective theory of value. 
Although neither utility nor measurability have an influence whatsoever on the subjective theory 
of value, we have to  pay attention to this relation considered the other way around. Further 
argumentation should be elaborated on the consequence of subjectivism  on interpersonal 
comparisons of value. If a value scale is revealed in the course of a subject’s action, then we can 
observe as many values scales as acting subjects. Therefore, the absence of a common scale of 
values should impede further comparisons and measures, i.e. interpersonal comparisons. 
Furthermore, the difference between the objectivist and subjectivist paradigm can also be 
highlighted when considering the consequences on economic policy. While objectivist scholars 
may advocate a hypostatization of values, subjectivism establishes an indissoluble link between 
values and  the  acting subject.  For this reason,  the advocates of objectivism  can sustain  a 
correction of the individuals’ scales of preferences through redistribution of resources and price 
fixation. Conversely, subjectivists cannot defend any  interventionist policy.  This idea should 
better explain the non-interventionist opinions of Austrian economists. It is therefore important 
to underline that the Austrian economists’ free market orientation is due neither to the emphasis 
on utility as value ingredient nor to the defense of ordinal values, but exclusively to the defense 
of subjectivism. Actually, the absence of a clear-cut definition of subjectivism and its superficial 
assimilation to utilitarianism may be at the origin of much confusion concerning the type of 
policy defended. At any rate, a further research should look for a clarification of the implications 
of  subjectivism  on  economic theory and policy.  The attention paid by Mises  to the 
methodological issues, and the fact that Mises represents the nub of recent debates on the 
redefinition of subjectivism are sufficient indicators to stimulate a deeper research on Mises’s   21 
own conception of subjectivism. In the meantime, this research can check the debate on radical 
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